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Abstract 
 
After a long impasse, Mercosur and the European Union are once again 
negotiating to reach a Free Trade Agreement. The benefits from such a trade 
liberalization would be significant since these are essentially complementary 
economic regions. An agreement would also end decades of costly trade diversion 
effects and few of these are quantified in this paper. But, trade is only one of the 
important issues in these negotiations. The biggest Mercosur countries are 
making efforts towards leaving behind a decade long experiment with populism 
that violated several World Trade Organisation  rules while Europe is 
increasingly being threatened by right wing populism that is outspoken in favor of 
inward-looking economic and social policies. A Mercosur-EU would create a 
significant economic region with enormous potential for trade creation; such an 
agreement would also serve to strengthen western trade institutions and challenge 
the populist threats that is hanging over both of these regions. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
After more than a decade of minimal progress, the European Union 
[EU] and Mercosur are actively negotiating with the goal of reaching 
an agreement on a Free Trade Agreement [FTA].2 Shortly after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Member, Academia Nacional de Ciencias Economicas Argentina (www.anceargentina.com). Email Id: 
noguesjuliojorge@gmail.com. I am gratefull to J. Michael Finger for commenting on a preliminary draft of 
this paper. Any remaining errors are my sole responsibility. 
2 The negotiations are being held under the principles of Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement 
signed in 1999. For text of the agreement see, Organisation of American States, Interregional Framework 
Cooperation Agreement, http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MER_EU/negotiations/Framework1995_e.pdf. See 
generally, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REGIONS: MERCOSUR, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
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these talks were initiated in the late 90s, Argentina and Brazil shifted 
towards extremely inward oriented trade policies guided by corrupt 
left-wing populism that openly violated many of the most significant 
World Trade Organisation [WTO] rules. Recently, the economic 
and political vision in both of these countries have once again 
shifted towards outward orientation and this has opened the 
opportunity for reaching an agreement with the EU. 
 
Important issues are at stake including trade goals. Likewise, but 
perhaps as important, in a world characterized by expanding 
populism, both sides have significant institutional themes that need 
to be developed and strengthened.3 How should parties assess the 
extent to which these negotiations will be beneficial to their people 
and economies? On the extreme end, one of the possible 
negotiating goals would be a strategy where each party attempts to 
come out as a clear winner in terms of market access; however, this 
would ignore the times we are living in. The near term outlook calls 
for a vision among like-minded politicians regarding the importance 
of strengthening increasingly threatened trade institutions. 
 
On the trade side, this paper reminds that since their inception, both 
the European Community [EC] and the EU have been very 
successful in expanding their internal markets as well as in 
negotiating and implementing numerous FTAs with non-member 
countries. In contrast, Mercosur has failed to expand markets either 
through inclusion of new countries (except troubled Venezuela!) or 
signing FTAs. A brief review of the literature and new estimates 
presented below suggests that a successful outcome will put an end 
to much of the costs associated with growing trade diversion that 
each region has inflicted on the other. 
 
Under the latest populist experience of Argentina and Brazil, trade 
flows (exports and imports) were quantitatively managed by few 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For a discussion of populism in Latin America during the last decade see Steven Levitsky & Kenneth M.  
Roberts, The Resurgence of the Latin American Left, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNI. PRESS, 
https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/394272/mod_resource/content/1/The%20Resurgence%20of%20
the%20Latin%20Ame%20-%20Steven%20Levitsky%20Intro.pdf. For a macroeconoomic analysis of 
populism in Latin America see Jose L. Machinea, “Populismos latinoamericanos a comienzos del siglo XXI: 
una caracterización económica” in Funglode and Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (Paris) (2017 
in print). For a recent perspective of populism in the US and Europe see JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST 
EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016).  
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bureaucrats who, after a formal petition from private firms and 
persons, would arbitrarily decide which would be approved or 
disapproved; this system meant adoption of corrupt means by all the 
parties involved in these decisions.4 This way of enacting policies 
was applied by Argentina with greater enthusiasm than Brazil. 
 
In contrast to the big countries in Mercosur, the EU is moving 
towards more nationalistic and populist policy proposals and the 
current political environment suggests that this tendency is likely to 
deepen.  A similar degree of arbitrary decision making has taken 
hold under Mr. Trump in the United States of America [US]; Mr. 
Trump has threatened to take a number of arbitrary 
micromanagement actions like increasing barriers for firms 
relocating abroad where production costs can be minimized. He has 
already imposed prohibitive immigration flows from several Muslim 
countries and has threatened to impose trade barriers against 
countries like China and Mexico, raising risky geopolitical tensions.5 
 
Some in Europe, like Marie Le Pen, have applauded these proposals. 
Under these circumstances, the leaders in favor of an open Europe 
should consider whether a successful negotiation with the 
Mercosur—which would create one of the biggest FTA in the 
world—could strengthen their case. The trade institutions of the 
Mercosur countries (particularly Argentina and Brazil) would also 
benefit greatly from a successful negotiation with the EU for it 
would help them lock-in reasonable trade rules. 
 
Also, on the trade front, the best case scenario is an agreement that 
would open highly protected markets (mainly agriculture in Europe 
and some highly protected industrial sectors and services in 
Mercosur). This time economists cannot just conclude that this FTA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Elias A. Baracat et al., Trade Reform and Institution Building: Peru and Argentina in the  WTO, 14(2) WORLD 
TRADE REV. 579 – 615 (2015) [Baracat, Trade Reform].  
For the underlying book extending the details and analysis of this paper see ELIAS A. BARACAT ET AL., 
SUSTAINING TRADE REFORM: INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA AND PERÚ (World Bank, 2013), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/782131468003316059/pdf/796180PUB0REPL00Box377374
B00PUBLIC0.pdf 
5 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, As President, Trump Can Shackle Trade. But Will He?, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Eco. 
(Jan. 5, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/president-trump-can-
shackle-trade-will-he [hereinafter Hufbauer, Trump].  
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will result in winners and losers. If this agreement stands, parties 
have to ensure that workers losing their jobs will be adequtely 
compensated. 
 
The rest of this paper has the following order: Section II reviews 
previous estimates of trade diversion effects triggered by the early 
expansions of the EC as well as the creation of Mercosur. Section 
III offers new estimates of trade diversion effects from the 
enlargement of the EU to several central and eastern European 
countries. Section IV will address other trade related issues like the 
political economy and rent-seeking; it also offers comments on 
threats from the growing populist tide in Europe, which also 
remains a political menace to Mercosur countries. The author offers 
few final remarks in Section V. 
 
II. Trade and Trade Diversion Between the EC and Mercosur 
 
This section starts by offering a brief review of the economic 
complementarity between Mercosur and the EU. Subsequently, it 
reviews part of the literature analyzing the trade diversion effects 
against the Mercosur from the EC’s expansions during the 80s and 
90s and against the EC and other countries following the creation of 
the Mercosur. 
 
1. Complementary Trade between Mercosur and the EU 
 
The EU is Mercosur’s most important trading partner. According to 
the data published in trademap, in 2015 the aggregate exports from 
Mercosur to the EU28 reached USD 46,847 million and accounted 
for 16% of total exports while EU’s exports to Mercosur reached 
USD 54,122 million. 
 
Trade patterns reflect the comparative advatage of these regions: 
Mercosur is relatively well endowed with natural resources and the 
EU is relatively well endowed with capital.6Accordingly, “Mercosur 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Estimates show that in terms of potential income gains for Mercosur, an ambitious FTA with the EU is at 
the top of the list. See, for e.g., Josefina Monteagudo & Masakazu Watanuki, Regional Trade Agreements For 
Mercosur: A Comparison Between The FTAA And FTA With The EU, 2 ÉCONOMIE INTERNATIONALE 53-76, 
https://www.cairn.info/revue-economie-internationale-2003-2-page-53.htm (Fr.). 
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is the biggest exporter of agricultural products to the EU (43% of 
total) and raw materials (28% of total), while the EU mostly exports 
manufactured products to Mercosur (machinery, transport 
equipment and chemicals). The EU is also a major exporter of 
commercial services to Mercosur, as well as one of the the biggest 
foreign investor in the region.”7 
 
2. Trade Diversion Effects Against Mercosur from the 
Expansions of the EC and EU During the 80s and 90s 
  
Initially before it became the EU in 1993, the EC completed several 
expansions towards western and south European countries. More 
recently in 2004 and 2007, the EU expanded to  several central and 
eastern European countries. Furthermore and most significantly, in 
1962 the then EC Members (Belgium, France, Holland, Italy and 
Luxembourg) agreed to implement the highly protectionist 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which since then has had to be 
adopted by all the joining countries. 
  
In case of countries that provided low protection to their 
agricultural sectors before joining the EC, it is most likely that their 
adoption of the CAP generated trade diversion effects against 
efficient agricultural exporters such as the Mercosur countries.  
  
During the 80s and 90s, the EC expanded to include Greece (1981), 
Spain and Portugal (1986) and then the EU expanded to Austria, 
Finland and Sweden (1995). At the time, Greece, Spain and Portugal 
were mostly agricultural-based economies that provided lower 
agricultural protection than that mandated by the CAP. If so, these 
expansions must have generated trade diversion effects against 
efficient exporters, particularly in the case of Spain which was by far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For, statistics on bilateral trade flows and general information on the relationships between both regions see 
PIERRE BOULANGER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, CUMULATIVE ECONOMIC IMPACT EFFECTS OF 
FUTURE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON EU AGRICULTURE (JRC Science For Policy Report, EUR 28206, 2016). 
For the first time in the history of the GATT, the EU agreed to negotiate its agricultural protectionism in the 
Uruguay Round. However, it resulted in only marginal liberalization see, for e.g.,  J. Michael Finger & Julo J. 
Nogués, The Unbalanced Uruguay Round: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations, 25 THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(2002). Furthermore, the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU continues to offer high protection to the 
member countries see Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2015, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, (2015), https://www.oecd.org/tad/agricultural-policies/monitoring-
evaluation-2015-highlights-july-2015.pdf. 
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the most economically important country joining the EC during the 
80s and 90s.8  
 
Based on the work by Goto,9 Table 1 shows the proportional 
variation in the average annual share of agricultural imports by Spain 
and Portugal from the EC members before and after joining the 
EC. The table also presents the same variation for the share of 
imports by the old EC members from Spain and Portugal . 
Following enlargement, these numbers show an notable increase in 
the intra-regional share of agricultural trade. Surprisingly, the 
numbers also suggest that these expansions helped to accelerate the 
agricultural exports from the old EC members to the new ones 
more than from the new EC members to the old ones. Goto 
presents similar estimates for the 1981 expansion of the EC to 
include Greece, which shows similar effects to those presented in 
Table 1 for Spain and Portugal. 
 
Figures in Table 1 are aggregates as they refer to all encompassing 
agricultural trade and therefore do not illuminate what was going on 
at the product level. In 2003, I presented disaggregated numbers for 
a sample of products in relation to the 1995 accession of Finland 
and Sweden to the EU.10 The first example in Table 2 shows that 
between 1991 and 2000 imports of apples by Sweden from 
Argentina declined while imports from the EU increased more than 
eleven times. It is clear that Sweden substituted imports that used to 
come from Argentina (and other efficient producers) with EU 
sources, which  the figures suggest were previously non-
competitive.11 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As per the figures for 2014 out of the total GDP of EU, Greece represents 1.2%; Spain and Portugal 
represents 12% and; Austria, Finland and Sweden represents 7% (see Figure 7). 
9 Junichi Goto, Regional Economic Integration and Agricultural Trade (The World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 1805, 1997), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/377041468771280438/Regional-
economic-integration-and-agricultural-trade [hereinafter Goto, Regional Economic Integration]. 
10 Julio J. Nogués, Mercosur Labyrinth and World Regionalism, 40 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA 452-459 (2003), 
http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0717-68212003012100010 [hereinafter Nogués, 
Mercosur Labyrinth]. 
11 The next section shows that apples are a highly protected commodity in the EU. 
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Table 1: Intra regional agricultural trade of Spain and Portugal 
with the EC before and after 1985: share in total agricultural 
imports.12 The “Before” figure are an average for the period 
between 1976-1985 and “After” figure are an average for the 
period between 1986-1995. 
 
Year Argentina EU15 
1991 10,1 3,6 
1992 14,5 1,9 
1993 5,1 0,0 
1994 2,8 0,0 
1995 5,3 23,5 
1996 3,9 29,8 
1997 3,8 38,4 
1998 3,0 37,7 
1999 2,9 34,6 
2000 2,1 40,9 
Table 2: Sweden’s imports of apples from Argentina and the 
EU15 (in million USD)13 
For two other products, Figures 1 and 2 show Brazil’s dramatic loss 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Goto, Regional Economic Integration, supra note 9. 
13 Nogués, Mercosur Labyrinth, supra note 10. 
Share of EC agricultural 
imports from Spain and 
Portugal 
Share of agricultural imports of 
Spain and Portugal from the EC 
Before After Variation Before After Variation 
2,7% 3,5% 29% 16,9% 27,6% 63% 
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of market share from 1990 to 2000. Figure 1 shows Brazil’s and 
EU15’s share in the import of horse meat by Finland, while Figure 2 
shows similar numbers for orange juice imported by Sweden. In 
1990, 80% of Finland’s imports of horse meat came from Brazil; 
but, by 2000, this share had declined to only 7%. During the same 
years, the corresponding share of the EC countries increased from 
15% to 79%.  
 
Figure 1: Finland’s imports of horse meat from Brazil and the 
EU15 between 1990 and 2000: % of aggregate horse meat 
imports.14 
Figure 2 shows that in 1990, Brazil’s share in the imports of frozen 
orange juice  by Sweden was 42%, but by 2000 it declined to only 
16%. In contrast, the shares of EU countries increased from zero to 
83%. Note that in all the three cases the crossing of the import 
share numbers from these two origins occurs around 1995, when in 
fact Finland and Sweden joined the EU.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Id. 
15 The next section will show that for apples and horse meat the degree of the EUs self sufficiency continued 
to increase until 2014.  
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Figure 2: Sweden’s imports of orange juice from Brazil and the 
EU15 between 1990 and 2000: % of aggregate frozen juice 
imports.16 
Quite clearly at the product level it is possible to find trade diversion 
effects that are more dramatic than what can be uncovered using 
aggregate agricultural trade numbers. For a sample of products, 
Section III will expand this type of disaggregated analysis to quantify 
the likely trade diversion against Argentina from the recent 
expansions of the EU to central and eastern European countries.  
Before that let us consider the evidence on trade diversion effects 
on third countries triggered by the creation of Mercosur. 
3. Terms of Trade Effects Against Third Countries from the 
Creation of Mercosur 
The trade diversion effects of a FTA can be studied by analyzing 
trade patterns as done above or by studying changes in relative 
prices of traded commodities between members and non-members. 
In 1999, the latter approach was taken by Chang and Winters.17 
Their analysis examines whether there was any difference in the 
import prices paid by Brazil on products coming from members and 
non-members before and after the formation of Mercosur.18 One 
would expect that after its formation, Mercosur’s important margins 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Nogués, Mercosur Labyrinth, supra note 10. 
17 Won Chang & L. Alan Winters, How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of Mercosur (The 
World Bank, Working Paper No. 2157, 1999), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-
2157 revised in Won Chang & L. Alan Winters, How Regional Blocs Affect Excluded Countries: The Price Effects of 
MERCOSUR, 92 AM. ECO. REV. 889-904 (2002) [hereinafter Chang & Winters, Regional Blocks].  
18 See Chang and Winters, 92 AM. ECO. REV. 889-904.  
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of tariff preferences provided by its Common External Tariff (CET) 
would have resulted in relatively higher import prices for goods 
coming from other members than from non-members. Put 
differently, one would expect the regional terms of trade to have 
moved in favor of Mercosur suppliers and against non-members.   
 
Among members, Argentina was chosen as Brazil’s source of 
regional imports as it is the second largest Mercosur partner, which 
also has a diversified economy that supplies a variety of agricultural 
and industrial products to Brazil.19 The non-member countries 
whose relative prices were being compared with those of Argentina 
included Chile, Germany, Japan, Korea and the US. Figure 3 
summarizes the main findings and shows that after the formation of 
Mercosur, Brazil’s relative import prices moved in favor of 
Argentina. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Brazil’s relative import prices: Argentina versus 
sample of other exporting countries.20  
 
Using 1991 aggregate imports as a base, the authors estimate the 
value of foregone exports of non-members from the decline in 
regional terms of trade (ToT) to have been 10%.21 Table 3 shows 
that in the sample, Germany suffered the second biggest loss; 
further, although other EU countries were not included, it is more 
than likely that following the formation of Mercosur, they also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE, http://www.trademap.org. (last visited Nov.15,2017) [hereinafter 
Trademap]. According to statistics published in trademap in 2016 the following were the major Harmonised 
System chapters covering goods exported from Argentina to Brazil: vehicles (87); cereals (10); plastics (39) 
and machinery (84).   
20 Chang & Winters, Regional Blocks, supra note 17. 
21 Chang & Winters, Regional Blocks, supra note 17. This number is not that different from the simulation that 
resulted in the lower terms of trade loss for non members: USD 802 millions (Table 7). 
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incurred exports costs from declining regional ToT. 
 
 
 
Country 
Exports to Brazil in 
1991 
Foregone exports 
from lower regional 
terms of trade  
Chile 524 -17,3 
Germany 2,030 -236 
Japan 1,350 -59 
Korea 147 -14 
USA 5,396 -624 
Total 9,446 -950,0 
Table 3: Total 1991 exports to Brazil and losses to non 
members from lower regional terms of trade (million USD).22 
 
Lastly, Chang and Winters concluded that: “…Price data on exports 
to Brazil from countries excluded from Mercosur show that 
preferential trading agreements hurt non-member countries by 
compelling them to reduce their prices to meet competition from 
suppliers within the regional trading bloc”. It can be stated that, 
generally, it is difficult to believe that there can be a FTA that does 
not create negative effects on non-members.23 
One can speculate whether the creation of Mercosur, partially or 
totally, compensated the trade diversion effects from the succesive 
enlargements of the EU, but we can be quite sure that in terms of 
comparative statics both regions lost. Starting in the new milleniu,m 
the future that awaited both of these regional arrangements were 
quite different. While the EU continued to expand towards several 
central and eastern European countries, the Mercosur (particularly 
Argentina and Brazil), once again and until late 2015, embraced 
arbitrary import substitution policies that implied both lower 
regional and non-regional imports. As a result, they eliminated all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Chang & Winters, Regional Blocks, supra note 17. 
23 This assertion is in contrast with the previous position of the EU.  See, for e.g., Allen, Gasiorek & Smith, 
Subseries IV - Impact on Trade and Investment, Trade Creation and Trade Diversion, THE SINGLE MARKET REVIEW 
SERIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/economic-
reports/docs/studies/stud12_en.pdf (“Concerns about ‘fortress Europe’ effects of the SMP (single market 
program) were unnecessary: the SMP has not in itself closed the EU market to third countries, nor has it 
been accompanied by protectionist measures.”). 
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possibilities of Mercosur concluding a FTA with the EU or for that 
matter, with any other law-abiding country. In particular, the 
widespread violation of WTO rules by Argentina is telling of the 
high degree of autarky into which its economy was taken by populist 
governments.24 
 
 
 
 
III.Trade Diversion Against Argentina Created by the EU 
Expansion Towards Central and Eastern European Countries  
 
Before these enlargements were implemented in 2004 and 2007, 
several observers concluded that they would not inflict costs against 
non-member countries. A study by Comisión Económica para 
América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) for example concluded that: 
“Por su composición, parece que las exportaciones de América 
Latina a la Unión Europea complementan las de los países de 
Europa central y oriental.”25 
 
The issue of trade overlap was brought up in another study arguing 
that there was no reason for Latin American Countries (LAC) to 
worry about the consequences of enlargement, since it would not 
hurt their interests; it stated that: “…for 78% of Latin American 
agricultural exports to the EU, there is no competitive threat from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Council for the Trade in Goods, Argentina’s Import Restricting Policies and Practices: Joint Statement by Australia, 
The European Union, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, 
Thailand, Turkey and The United States, WTO Doc. G/C/W/667 (Apr. 4, 2012).  This statement begins by 
stating that: “We would like to express jointly our continuing and deepening concerns regarding the nature 
and application of trade-restrictive measures taken by Argentina, which are adversely affecting imports into 
Argentina from a growing number of WTO Members” and ends by stating that: “We Members who support 
this Joint Statement request that Argentina take immediate steps to address the concerns we have raised 
today, and that many Members have raised in the past, by removing or terminating these import-restrictive 
measures and practices.” Shortly after this statement was released Argentina was taken to the Dispute 
Settlement Body which eventually concluded that it had violated several WTO rules and agreements. For a 
detailed discussion of the trade policies applied by governments during this period and the WTO dispute see, 
Baracat, Trade Reform, supra note 4. 
25 Peter Nunnekamp, Efectos para America Latina de la Expansion de la Union Europea, 64 COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA 
PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE 111-127 (1998). [“The product composition of Latin American exports 
to the EU sugest that they complement those by central and eastern european countries” (author’s 
translation)[hereinafter Nunnekamp].  
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the CEEC countries.”26 
At the time, I questioned these conclusions by stating that: “… The 
experience of the Mercosur’s countries during the 90s of rapidly 
expanding agricultural output and exports following structural 
reforms suggest that exactly the same could happen in the CEECs 
with negative effects on third countries.”27 As analyzed, for example 
by Bierut et. al., this was what eventually happened.28 
This section analyzes trade patterns that point in the direction of 
trade diversion effects against Argentina post the the 2004 and 2007 
EU enlargements29. Argentina is used here as an example of the 
broader effects that are likely to have occurred against the other 
Mercosur countries that export agricultural products. First, we 
present brief considerations on the aggregate statistics on income 
and per capita exports of the new EU members. Then, we discuss 
several pieces of information regarding the structure and the extent 
of agricultural protection that these countries had prior to the 
enlargement of EU and their adoption of the CAP. Finally, for a 
small sample of products (honey; wine; horse meat; sunflower oil; 
apples and animal feed),30 we analyze the indicators that suggest the 
occurence of trade diversion effects against Argentina triggered by 
these latest EU enlargements. 
 
1. Aggregate Trade Patterns 
 
Table 4 shows GDP and per capita GDP of the new members. It is 
well known that the difference in the average degree of economic 
development between the EU15 and the new members, which for 
simplicity we will call EUnew, is quite telling. In 2014 the EU15 had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 SERGIO A. BERUMEN, CLOSER EUROPEAN UNION LINKS WITH EASTERN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LATIN AMERICA (1997). CEEC stands for “Central and East European Countries” [hereinafter BERUMEN, 
EUROPEAN UNION]. 
27 Nogués, supra note 10 at 456. 
28 Beata K. Bierut & K. Kuziemska-Pawlak, Competitiveness and Export Performance of CEE countries (Narodowy 
Bank Polski, Working Paper No. 248, 2016), https://www.nbp.pl/publikacje/materialy_i_studia/248_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Bierut, CEE Countries]. 
29 These enlargements included the countries listed in Table 4. Croatia joined the EU in 2013 but because our 
estimates use 2000-2014 time series, the trade patterns of this country have not been included. 
30 These products were chosen for no particular reason other than they were exportable and covered a range 
of the agricultural chapters of the harmonized system (Chapters 1-24 of the HS). Note that these products are 
not among those often mentioned as being highly protected by the EU such as sugar, bovine meat and dairy 
products. 
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a per capita GDP USD45,700 while the average for the EUnew was 
USD16,700 dollars.31 
 
Table 4: GDP and per capita GDP.32 
Note: *=Adopted the euro.  
 
Table 5 shows that except for Bulgaria and Chipre, the rest of the 
new members have a relatively high export to GDP ratio. In part, 
this is due to the fact that shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall 
several of these countries adopted trade liberalization programs and 
despite the fact that some of such initiatives were later partly 
reversed, at the time of joining the EU the new members were more 
open than they had been under communist rule.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This is a simple average of individual countries’ per capita GDP as per World Bank database. 
32 Author’s own elaboration based on UN data published in Wikipedia. 
33 By the time of joining the EU, these countries had improved their productive efficiencies. Pavel Ciaian & 
Johan F.M. Swinnen, Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Central and Eastern Europe (The World Bank, 
Agricultural Distortions, Working Paper No. 07, 2007), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-1163022714097/Eastern 
_Europe_0309rev.pdf [Ciaian & Swinnen, Distortions].  See also Beirut, CEE Countries, supra note 28. 
Country 
2014 GDP (billion 
USD) 
 2014 per capita  
GDP(USD) 
Bulgaria 532 7,620 
Chipre* 23 26,370 
Check republic 205 18,350 
Estonia* 26 19,010 
Hungary 138 13,340 
Latvia* 31 15,250 
Lithuania* 48 15,440 
Malt* 10 21,000 
Poland 545 13,680 
Romania 199 9,520 
Slovak republic* 100 17,750 
Slovenia* 49 23,580 
Total EU12 1,906 16,743 
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Table 5: 2014 exports and exports to GDP ratio.34  
For the sample of products, Table 6 shows the value of Argentina’s 
exports and the physical ratio of exports to production. The most 
significant product is wine with exports totalling USD741. million. 
In 2014 exports of the products in the sample reached USD 1,797 
million and represented 2.5% of the Argentina’s aggregate exports. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Author’s own elaboration on the basis of data from UN data published in Wikipedia and Trademap, supra, 
note 19. 
 
Country 
 
Exports (mill 
USD) 
 
GDP (2014 in mill 
USD) 
 
Expo/GDP 
(%) 
Bulgaria 25,779 57,000 4,8 
Chipre 1,931 23,000 8,4 
Check 
republic 
155,678 
205,000 75,9 
Estonia 13,965 26,000 53,7 
Hungary 100,167 138,000 72,6 
Latvia 11,500 31,000 37,1 
Lithuania 25,499 48,000 53,1 
Malt 2,581 10,000 25,8 
Poland 194,461 545,000 35,7 
Romania 60,605 199,000 30,4 
Eslovaquia 75,257 100,000 75,3 
Slovenia 26,616 49,000 54,3 
Total 
EU12 
694,039 
1,481,000 
46,9 
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Product  
Value of 
exports (in 
million 
USD) 
Export-
output 
ratio 
 
 
Note 
Sunflower oil 289 15% - 
Honey 204 95% - 
Wine 741 19% - 
 
 
Horse meat 
 
 
60 
 
 
100% 
The export-output 
ratio is assumed to be 
100%. 
Apples 138 22% 2013 
 
Animal feed 
 
365  20% 
Food for cats and 
dogs. This is an 
estimate for 2012. 
Total 1,797 NA NA 
Note: NA= not applicable. 
Table 6: Argentina’s exports and export/output ratio (physical 
volumes): 2014 unless otherwise stated.35 
 
2. Agricultural Protection in the EUnew and EU15 
As mentioned, the lower the level of protection before accession 
and the higher the margin of trade preference created by moving 
towards the CAP levels, the more likely that trade diversion effects 
against Mercosur and other efficient agricultural exporters would 
take place.36 Unfortunately, data on product specific level of 
protection of the new members before accession was not readily 
available, so in order to arrive at a rough assessment, we relied on 
studies undertaken at a more aggregate level which quite clearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Value and quantity exported from Trademap supra note 19. For the sources of physical volumes of 
sunflower oil see BOLSA DE CEREALES DE CÓRDOBA, http://www.bccba.com.ar (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); 
for  honey see PORTAL APÍCOLA, http://api-cultura.com/argentina-sigue-perdiendo-terreno-a-nivel-
mundial/(last visited Nov. 15, 2017); for wine see INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VITIVINICULTURA, 
http://www.inv.gov.ar/index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); for horse meat author’s own estimate; for 
apples see MINISTERIO DE ECONOMÍA, https://www.economia.gob.ar (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); and for 
animal feed see Carlos Manzoni, El alimento para gatos y perros mueve millones, LA NACION, (last visited Jun. 02, 
2013),http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1587425-el-alimento-para-gatos-y-perros-mueve-millones.   
36 For, a discussion on the adoption of the CAP by the new members see Enlargement, Two Years After: An 
Economic Evaluation, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN POLICY ADVISERS & DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC 
AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, ECFIN/REP/53347, (2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication7548_en.pdf.  
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conclude that before accession, agricultural protection of the 
EUnew was lower than that prevailing in the EU15. 
For example, in 2000 OECD observed that: “Current levels of 
protection for industrial goods in some CEECs (central and eastern 
European countries) are considerably above EU levels, while 
agricultural protection is much lower.”37 This also comes out quite 
clearly in the only country specific study we have found presenting 
agricultural protection levels before and after joining the EU: “… a 
review of the detailed data shows that there are many cases when 
the gradual liberalization increased Slovakia’s agricultural imports 
from the EU15 + CEEC while at the same time Slovakia 
agricultural imports from the ROW decreased. Out of 193 
agricultural commodities classified by the four-digit HS code, in 42 
cases agricultural imports from the EU15 + CEEC increased 
between 2000– 2001 and 2004–2005, while imports from the ROW 
declined. This is an indication that imports from the EU15 + 
CEEC, which are positively discriminated against, replaced imports 
from the ROW, an indication of trade diversion.”38 
The detailed study by Anderson and Swinnen also arrives at similar 
conclusions: “Between 2000 and 2003, the average rate of assistance 
to agriculture in the CEE10 was just under 25%, slightly less than 
half the rate of assistance (including from programs somewhat 
decoupled from production), provided to farmers in the EU15.”39 
These authors also suggest that adoption of the CAP is expected to 
have increased the rate of assistance to a level closer to that of the 
EU15 farmers.  
Much of the assistance to agriculture in the EU is provided by the 
prices paid by consumers that remain above international levels. On 
the Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE), Anderson and Swinnen 
estimated in 2008 that “…in 2000-2003 the CTE of the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 The EU Policies and their Economic Effects, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2000), http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/1886277.pdf. 
38 Dusan Drabik et al., Trade Creation and Diversionin the Enlarged EU Market: Evidence for Agricultural Trade in 
Slovakia, 57 Czech J. of Eco. and Fin., 9-10 (2007). 
39 Tim Josling, Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Western Europe (The World Bank, Agricultural Distortions 
Working Paper No. 61, 2009), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-1146153362267/Western 
_Europe_0908.pdf. CEE10 refers to the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
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members was 17% …compared with nearly twice that in the 
EU15.”40 
Accession by the new members to the EU also ensured  investment 
in their agricultural sectors and this coupled with access to a wide 
protected market, propelled agricultural exports to Europe.41 
Finally, it is also of importance to note that so far we have only 
referred to standard protectionist instruments such as tariffs and 
quotas. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to stress that some observers 
highlight the importance of non-tariff measures as  barriers to enter 
the EU market. For example, a recent piece mentions that: 
“…Australia has already initiated preliminary discussions with the 
EU about an Australia-EU free trade agreement, and it seems likely 
that if such an agreement eventuates, there will be some downward 
movement in the level of agricultural tariffs imposed on agricultural 
imports by the EU. In the past, such changes have tended to be 
offset by increases in technical trade barriers (for example 
biosecurity and safety testing protocols) meaning that the net impact 
is difficult to estimate.”42 
 
Therefore, the global picture that emerges indicates that before 
accession the new members had lower levels of agricultural 
protection than the EU15 and this level increased on accession. 
Under this dynamic pattern of trade policy changes we would expect 
that for any given agricultural product exported by non-members to 
the EU three effects would take place: 1) exports to the EU27 
would decelerate or decline as the twelve EUnew countries adopted 
the CAP protection levels; 2) given the increasing levels of 
investments by the EU15 countries in the agricultural sectors of the 
new members that expanded their productive capacities, the share 
of the EU15 imports from the new countries would increase, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Kym Anderson & Johan Swinnen, Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (The 
World Bank, Agricultural Distortions Working Paper No. 23, 2009), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRADERESEARCH/Resources/544824-1163022714097 /Eastern 
_Europe_0309rev.pdf.  
41 Ciaian & Swinnen, Distortions, supra note 33, at 28 (“For the CEE countries wanting to join the EU, 
accession (or wider European integration) had taken priority. Moreover, they benefitted strongly from private 
inflows of capital, know-how and technology, for example through large foreign direct investment in their 
food industries in the late 1990s and 2000s”). 
42 Mick Keogh, The Impact on Australian Agriculture of Britain Leaving the EU,  AUSTRALIAN FARM INSTITUTE 
(2016). 
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whereas the imports from relatively efficient non-members 
exporters like Argentina would decline; and 3) therefore, the 
enlargement would result in an increase in the degree of the EU27 
agricultural self sufficiency. 
 
We have analyzed these hypotheses for six products: apples, honey, 
horse meat, sunflower oil, wine and animal feed. Before presenting 
the results, a brief comment on the current level of protection in the 
EU provided to these products is in order as following the 
enlargement the protective schedules of the new members increased 
towards these levels. Appendix A shows that of the six products, 
three are protected with ad valorem tariffs and two  of them (horse 
meat and sunflower oil), have relatively low trade barriers. Honey is 
the third product and its ad valorem tariff at 17,3% is quite high. 
 
The other three products are highly protected. First, apples are 
classified under ten tariff lines all of which have an ad valorem plus 
a specific tariff that varies according to the month of the year. 
Second, wine is classified under 51 tariff lines all of which are 
specific. Finally, animal feed is classified under 17 tariff lines and 
here the specific component reaches a maximum of 948 euros 
which implies an ad valorem equivalent tariff close to 100%.43 
 
3.Trade Patterns and Trade Diversion in an Enlarged  EU 
 
3.1 Argentina’s Exports to the EU27 and the World 
 
Figure 4 shows the time paths of Argentina’s exports to the world 
and to the EU27 for the abovementioned products. These trends 
indicate that Argentina’s declining export shares to the EU are not 
correlated with exports to the world, which in fact has been more 
dynamic. The differences are sufficiently strong to suggest that these 
widening time paths are likely to be attributable to the EU’s 
agricultural protection and the dynamic export behavior of the new 
members (EUnew).44 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In 2012 the unit price of Argentina’s exports of animal feed was USD 980 per ton.  
44 For, all six products and for the most recent years, the graph shows deceleration of export growth which to 
a great extent should be attributed to the increasing peso overvaluation under a controlled exchange rate 
regime that was enforced between 2011 and 2015 see, for e.g., Baracat, Trade Reform, supra note 4.  
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Annex B presents tests for the difference between the means of 
several of the variables discussed in this section. Table B1 of that 
annex shows the tests for the difference between the means of 
Argentina’s aggregate exports and exports to the EU 27 for two 
periods: 2001-2003 (before enlargement, m1) and 2005-2014 (after 
enlargement, m2). The values of the t-statistic indicate that the 
difference between the means in Argentina’s exports to these two 
destinations grew after enlargement suggesting that the forces 
leading to trade diversion were likely to be working.45 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Exports of Argentina to the world and to the EU27 
(000 USD).46 
 
3.2 Pattern of the EU15 Imports 
 
Figure 5 presents the share of Argentina and that of the EUnew in 
EU15 imports.47 Except for wine, the EU15 import pattern is 
characterized by an increasing share from the EUnew and a 
declining share from Argentina. For four of the products (sunflower 
oil, horse meat, apples and honey) the shares of both origins cross 
during the period of analysis indicating that the new members had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The underlying time series data is from trademap where observations begin in 2001. Given that at the time 
of processing the data some observations for 2015 were missing, we ended the statistical analysis in 2014. 
46 Author’s own elaboration on the basis of Trademap supra note 19. 
47 In addition to individual country trade data, trademap also presents data by several groupings including the 
EU15 and EU27. EU15 imports from the new members (EUnew) are estimated as the difference between 
EU15 imports from EU27, and EU15 imports from EU15. 
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or created sufficient productive capacity so as to partly replace 
Argentina (and other efficient exporters) as suppliers to the EU15. 
The shares for wine also cross; but, this is not because the EUnew 
substituted Argentina, since its export share to the EU15 also 
increased.48 
 
Figure 5: Share of Argentina and the EUnew in EU15 imports: 
% of aggregate imports49 
 
 
Figure 6 in consonance with the previous discussion, shows that in 
all of these products the EU27 has become increasingly self-
sufficient. As discussed above, except for wine, the increasing 
exports of the EUnew to the EU15 is part of the explanation. In the 
case of wine, this increasing self-sufficiency should be attributed to 
increasing exports by the EU15.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Table B2 in appendix B shows that most of these differences are statistically significant. 
49 Author’s own elaboration on the basis of Trademap supra note 19. 
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Summing up, this section has shown a correlation between the 
enlargement of the EU (on inclusion of members from the Eastern 
and Central Europe during 2004 and 2007) and the loss of trade 
shares in this market that characterizes several of Argentina’s agro 
industrial products (and probably that of other efficient exporters as 
well). In four of the six products we find that the share of Argentina 
in the EU15 imports declined while the degree of the EU27’s self 
sufficiency increased. We also find that the time paths of 
Argentina’s exports to the EU was increasingly below that of its 
exports to the world.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Intra EU27 imports relative to aggregate EU27 
imports.50 
Finally, the increasing degree of the EUs self-sufficiency that 
characterizes most of the products in the sample is in contrast to the 
overall degree of the EU’s self sufficiency, which in fact has been 
declining.51 This is another reason to suspect that the loss of 
Argentina’s agricultural exports in the EU market can be traced to 
an increasing number of new members adopting the highly 
protectionist CAP. This conclusion is in contrast to several studies, 
which were conducted before enlargement, predicting that this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Author’s own elaboration on the basis of Trademap supra note 19. 
51 According to numbers in trademap in 2005, intra EU27 imports as a share of aggregate EU27 imports was 
64%, while in 2014 this number had declined to 57%. 
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policy would have minimal effects on LAC countries.52 
 
IV. Political Economy Issues 
 
It is quite clear from the previous sections that Mercosur and the 
EU have inflicted trade diversion costs on each other. It is also the 
case that among the FTA options opened to the EU the one with 
Mercosur holds the promise of generating one of the most 
significant trade creation zones in the world.53 Beyond trade, what 
else can be said to be in favor of a balanced FTA between Mercosur 
and the EU? In what follows, we address issues related to political 
economy and rent seeking as well as to populism and trade 
institutions. 
 
1. Political Economy and Rent Seeking 
 
A successful outcome of the Mercosur-EU negotiations would 
entail moving their productive systems in a direction which will 
allow each partner to undertake relevant structural transformations 
that will put their economies in a better position to accelerate and 
sustain their economic growth. This entails opening economies and 
improving resource allocation, while at the same time, reducing the 
wastage from rent seeking activities.  
 
Meaningful liberalization in Mercosur includes liberalizing trade in 
protected manufacturing and service sectors while for the EU it 
entails liberalizing trade in agriculture.54 Not surprisingly, the 
strongest opposition to this liberalization comes from the sectors 
that are most protected within each of these regions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Nunnekamp, supra note 25; BERUMEN, EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 26. 
53 In terms of GDP, among the ongoing FTA negotiations by the EU, the following are the most significant: 
US, Japan, Mercosur and Australia. Given that under Trump the TTIP is unlikely to materialize, the two most 
significant FTA negotiations are with Japan and Mercosur. For, the significance of economic size for defining 
the negotiating priorities of the EU see, e.g.,  Patrick Messerlin, The Mercosur-EU Preferential Trading Agreement: A  
view from Europe (Centre for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 377, 2013), 
http://aei.pitt.edu/40233/1/WD_377_Messerlin_Mercosur-EU_Trade.pdf. 
54 For an analysis of the impact of an FTA agreement with the Mercosur (as well as other relatively likely 
agreements) on the EU agricultural sector see Boulanger, supra note 7. Also, for the effects of the TTIP on 
agricultural sectors see Caser B. Cororaton & David Orden, Potential Economic Effects of the Reduction in 
Agricultural and Nonagricultural Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic and Investment Partnership,  International 
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (2016). 
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Both Mercosur and the EU, have been clinging for decades to 
structures of protection that have shielded major economic sectors 
from external competition. Arbitrary and excessively high industrial 
protection has been a drag for the Mercosur economies and their 
consumers particularly in Argentina and Brazil55. Having both 
liberalized between the late 80s and early years of this millennium, 
they then, under populist governments, reverted to highly 
protectionist industrial policies and this trend lasted until late 2015. 
Between 2006 and 2015, Argentina also discriminated heavily 
against its primary exporting sectors at a very high cost.56 
 
Agricultural protectionism in the EU is also a drag to these 
economies. Although this is not the place to discuss the costs of the 
CAP, consider the fact that only around 3% of the EU is engaged in 
agriculture and yet this sector receives by far the single most 
important subsidy item of the EU budget. EU consumers also pay 
prices of food products above international levels. 
 
In Argentina, up to the late 2015 and adding to the losses triggered 
by high protectionism, was a system of trade policy administration 
where bureaucratic arbitrariness, instead of transparent ad valorem 
tariffs, had the say of the day. Bureaucrats chose sectors and 
enterprises to grant or deny them petitions for import and export 
licenses.57 Rent seeking and corruption activities flourished under a 
system divorced from international and regional trade rules. By one 
estimate, in 2012 the value of protectionist rents generated by 
arbitrary export permits, which is only a fraction of the rents 
generated by trade controls on imports, reached USD 1,600 million; 
further, over the period 2006 and 2015, while export barriers were 
enforced, aggregate protectionist rents were in the order of USD 
9,000 million.58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See, for e.g., Julio J. Nogués, Barreras sobre las exportaciones agropecuarias: impactos económicos y sociales de su 
eliminación, (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 3, 2015), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/03/26071462/barriers-agricultural-exports-economic-
social-impacts-disposal-barreras-sobre-las-exportaciones-agropecuarias-impactos-económicos-y-sociales-de-
su-eliminación. 
56 See, for e.g., id. 
57 Baracat, Trade Reform, supra note 4. 
58 While only the exports of a few major agricultural products were arbitrarily regulated, between 2011 and 
late 2015 all imports were arbitrarily licensed. Several newspaper articles have raised corruption suspicions 
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As said, the opposition to the Mercosur-EU trade negotiations 
comes mainly from the most protected sectors. In the EU, a large 
number of countries led by France have stated their opposition to 
negotiations with the Mercosur.59 Thus, rent seeking by highly 
protected EU farmers have already made their way to the highest 
political levels. For example, the Irish opposition is grounded on 
“…adverse market developments arising from increased access for 
Mercosur beef to the EU market, given that more than 90% of Irish 
beef production is exported to the EU market.”60 
 
2. Populism and Trade Rules 
 
It takes only a fraction of the time necessary to build systems of 
openness and transparency to undo them. Shortly after taking power 
in 2003 a new government in Argentina was walking over the rules 
based trade policy which it inherited from the reformist 
governments of the 90s.61 In contrast, since 2015 governments in 
the Mercosur countries particularly Argentina and Brazil, face the 
daunting challenge and lengthy hurdle of moving away from 
decades old populist economic policies.62 
 
Populism is also threatening the EU. In terms of economic 
magnitude, Figure 7 shows that Brexit is of higher significance than 
the numerous countries from central and eastern Europe that joined 
the EU in recent years.63 The growing number of citizens that in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
surrounding these regulations. For import permits, see, e.g., Cronista Comercial, La afip denuncio fraudes con las 
djai por usd14.000 millones: hubo giro de divisas al exterior sin que hubiera ingreso de mercaderías, EL CRONISTA, Aug. 17, 
2016, http://www.cronista.com/economiapolitica/La-AFIP-denuncio-fraudes-con-las-DJAI-por-us-14.000-
millones-20160817-0070.html. For, export permits, see, e.g., Matías Longoni, GRANOS: 25% De los permisos de 
exportación va a firmas dudosas, CLARIN, May 31, 2015, http://www.clarin.com/ieco/granos-permisos-
exportacion-firmas-dudosas _0_SJZb5ut Dme. amp.html  
59 See Christian Oliver & Tobias Buck, France Leads Revolt Against Mercosur Trade Talks, F.T., May 5, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/d7ac18ec-12a9-11e6-839f-2922947098f0. 
60 See Irish beef farmers strongly reject accord with Mercosur, MERCO PRESS, Apr. 8, 2016, 
http://en.mercopress.com/2016/04/08/irish-beef-farmers-strongly-reject-accord-with-mercosur-protest-
letter-to-trade-commissioner-malmstrom. 
61 Baracat, Trade Reform, supra note 4. Another example is Mr. Trump’s decision to abandon the TPP. 
62 In the short run and on matters of trade, for Argentina this means among others: i) complying with adverse 
rulings under the WTO dispute mechanism; ii) returning Mercosur to the basic rules upon which it was 
created and, iii) reorganizing the administration of trade policy including unfair trade measures, in line with 
WTO rules. Progress has been achieved in all three fronts. 
63 Although the goals sought by the UK in the Brexit negotiations with the EU lead us to identify it as a 
country that has tilted towards populism, the extent to which this label will hold when it comes to 
implementation of the Brexit agreement remains to be seen. We cannot rule out the possibility that in two 
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Europe are apparently embracing populist proposals have also 
increased the likelihood that other countries could eventually leave.64 
Even if this does not occur, Europe will be faced with increasing 
protectionist demands. Moreover, Mr. Trump has also not been 
kind to NAFTA and the WTO65. Essentially, in only a matter of few 
months the events that have evolved are threatening the trading 
system that has, painstakingly, taken decades to construct. 
 
 
Figure 7: Relative Economic Importance of the EUs 
successive enlargements and contraction (Brexit): percent of 
EU27 GDP.66 
 
 
Confronting these threats succesfully will require unique political 
skills. By the recent experience of Mercosur in the serious 
difficulties implied by attempting to leave behind its populist 
culture, leaders should consider knitting together defensive 
agreements and implementing reforms that could help to sustain 
growth while at the same time ensuring that those workers who will 
bear the costs of adjustment will be adequately compensated. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
years time the UK will become a liberalized country as it has been leading continental Europe in this 
direction. 
64 In such a world Mercosur will no longer face the trade diversion costs created by an expansionary EU but 
it will face an increasingly arbitrary protectionism that is likely to be even more damaging. 
65 Hufbauer, Trump, supra note 5. 
66 UN data published in Wikipedia. 
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Clearly Europe’s traditional structures that have consolidated under 
protection should also give way to reform. The CAP is one of such 
niches of high protection that requires change so as to ensure that 
domestic consumer prices move closer to international levels 
thereby increasing the likelihood of consumers voting in favour of 
an open rules-based trading system.  
 
A balanced and ambitious Mercosur-EU FTA could go a long way 
in facilitating this process as well as strengthening that segment of 
Mercosur and Europe’s leadership that still hold the basic 
foundations of the post World War II trading system in high 
esteem.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper argues that during the last decades, the creation of 
Mercosur and the successive enlargements of the EU have inflicted 
extensive trade diversion costs against each other. Therefore, the 
forces that have impeded reaching an agreement on a Mercosur-EU 
FTA during this long period of time have been quite costly to both 
regions. 
This failure has two main origins: first, the EU’s agricultural 
protectionism, which has strengthened interest groups in their effort 
to create a barrier and prevent the EU from coming up with a 
reasonable trade offer; and, second, starting the new millenium and 
until 2015, the arbitrary protectionism practised by Argentina and 
Brazil, which was well divorced from the spirit of oppeness and 
support for the multilateral trading system that characterized the 
90s. 
On the political economy front, we stress the fact that the new 
governments in the Mercosur are making efforts to leave behind not 
only the recent experience with arbitrary protectionism, but decades 
of populism which in fact has been the major reason explaining the 
long run economic decay of this region. Populism is essentially a 
socially divisive political strategy that aims to gain and maintain 
political control at whatever economic costs. The political discourse 
that goes with it points towards internal and external forces that are 
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to be blamed for the social conditions. Once in control, populism 
seeks to remain in power by implementing any policy option that is 
perceived to increase its voting force. Populism drives in the 
massess who view their charismatic leader as the solution to their 
conditions. The southern cone countries are clear examples of the 
negative effects of populism. 
Presently, the political systems of Europe are also being threatened 
by populist ideas that are challenging with increasing force, the 
political power of politicians who embrace the idea of an open and 
competitive Europe. This brings closer to home the specter of 
forces seeking to modify for the worst, the rules-based system that 
flourished after WWII something that would naturally result in a 
contraction of world trade. 
European and Mercosur leaders should therefore carefully consider 
the balance of rules and market access that is likely to ensure that 
this FTA will consolidate an important and open western economic 
block that can resist the propagation of populist economic policies 
and sustain long-run economic growth. 
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Annexures 
 
Annex A: Current protection granted by the EU to the sample 
products67 
 
HS 
classifi
cation Product 
No. tariff 
lines 
Average 
ad 
valorem 
tariff 
Non 
AV 
tariff Maximum Note 
80810 Apples                                                                                                                                             10 None 10 
11,2%+Euro 
23,8/100 kg
All lines have 
mixed tariffs
40900 Honey 1 17.3% 0 0 ---- 
20500 
Horse 
meat 3 5.1% 0 0 Only AV tariffs 
151211 
Sunflowe
r oil 3 6.4% 0 0 Only AV tariffs 
220421 Wine 51 None 51 
206ECU/To
n 
All are non AV 
tariffs  
230990 
Animal 
feed 17 7.4% 12 
Euro948/To
n 
All non AV 
tariffs are 
specific 
         
AnnexB: Testing for the difference between means of variables 
during 2001-2003 (before enlargement) and 2004-20014 (after 
enlargement). 
 
This annex presents the t values for the difference between means 
of the variables discussed in section III.68 We seek to highlight 
differences between the periods 2001/2003 before new members 
(EUnew) entered the EU, and 2005/2014 after the enlargement of 
EU. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_ schedules_table _e. htm. 
68 For the null hypothesis, the t statistic used is as follows: 
t = (m2-m1)/standard error of the difference between means. Here, m2 and m1 are the means in the second 
and first period respectively. The t values of a two tail test for 10 degrees of freedom are 1.81 and 2.23 for 
10% and 5% confidence levels respectively. 
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Table B1 presents the mean of the difference between Argentina’s 
aggregate exports of the corresponding product, and exports to the 
EU27 for two periods: 2001-2003 and 2005-2014 (000USD). Figure 
4 in the text shows that this difference widened after 2004 indicating 
that for Argentina, penetrating the EU market became increasingly 
difficult after these enlargements. In all cases, the difference is 
statistically significant. 
 
Table B1: Testing for the difference between Argentina’s aggregate 
exports and exports to the UE27 (USD000): m1 is the mean of the 
difference between aggregate exports and exports to EU27 during 
2001-2003, and m2 is the mean of the same difference during 2005-
2014.69 
Product m 1 m 2 t 
Sunflower oil 351,792 583,282 3.0* 
Horse meat 9,403 34,330 8.6* 
Apples 38,718 97,758 7.3* 
Honey 35,720 95,154 3,1* 
Wine 96,041 508,252 6.8* 
Animal feed 28,077 274,539 3.7* 
Note: * = Different from zero with a 5% confidence level. 
 
Table B2 test for the difference between the share of the EU15 
imports from Argentina and from the new members (EUnew). The 
negative t values indicate that except for wine, the share of EU15 
imports from Argentina declined and in four of the other five 
products the decline is statistically significant with a 5% confidence 
level. In contrast, the share of the EU15 imports from the EUnew 
increased and in four of the products this increase is statistically 
significant. Therefore, Argentina’s export deceleration appear to be 
partly attributable to the agricultural heightened export dynamism of 
the EUnew following enlargement. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Author’s own elaboration on the basis of Trademap supra note 19. 
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Table B2: Testing for the difference between the means of the 
EU15 import shares from Argentina and from the EUnew (%)70 
Product Source m1 
(%) 
m2 
(%) 
t 
 
Sunflower oil 
Argentina 19.5 8.5 -1.8 
EUnew 0.9 10.6 1.5 
 
Horse meat 
Argentina 22.2 15.7 -15.0* 
EUnew 4.6 15.9 11.9* 
 
Apples 
Argentina 5.3 3.8 -2.1 
EUnw 0.6 2.0 3.8* 
 
Honey 
Argentina 22.2 13.1 -3.6* 
EUnew 15.8 16.7 0.3 
 
Wine 
Argentina 1.0 1.3 4.2* 
EUnew 1.3 0.5 -6.3* 
 
Animal feed 
Argentina 0.5 0.03 -35.7* 
EUnew 4.3 6.7 3.1* 
Note: * = Different from zero with a 5% confidence level. 
 
Finally, Table B3 presents the t test for the differences of the EUs 
degree of self sufficiency between both periods. Except for 
sunflower oil the t test is positive and statistically significant 
indicating that in these other products, after enlargement the EU27 
became more self sufficient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Author’s own elaboration on the basis of Trademap supra note 19. 
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Table B3: Testing for the difference in the EU27 degree of self 
sufficiency between 2001-2003 and 2005-2014: EU27 imports as 
a share of aggregate imports of the corresponding product 
(%)71 
 
Product 
 
m1 
                       
m2 
                         
t 
Animal feed  
0,84  0,89 
 
5,3* 
Horse meat 0,40 0,52 5,5* 
Sunflower oil 0,63 0,63 -0,0 
Apples 0,58 0,64 3,5* 
Honey 0,42 0,48 2,5* 
Wine 0,68 0,74 4,2* 
Note: * = Different from zero with a 5% confidence level. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Id. 
